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ABSTRACT
U.S. safeguard actions have run into problems with the WTO's Panel and Appellate Body reviews
for failing to ensure that injury caused by non-import factors is not attributed to imports. This paper
reviews the subtle legal and economic differences between U.S. trade law (Section 201) and the
WTO's Agreement on Safeguards on the non-attribution issue. The paper then resurrects the Kelly
(1988) method of attributing injury to various factors as a potential method by which the ITC can
ensure that future decisions conform with the Safeguards Agreement. The method is shown to yield
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douglas.irwin@dartmouth.edu1  Furthermore, if policymakers wish to shift the use of trade remedies from antidumping
to safeguards actions, this task is made more difficult to the extent that the WTO agreements
create legal obstacles to the use of safeguard measures.  See Bown (2002).  
Causing Problems?
The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in U.S. Section 201 Cases
1.  Introduction
Since the Uruguay Round Agreements went into effect in 1995, the U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC) has rendered six affirmative decisions on cases filed under Section 201
of the Trade Act of 1974, the so-called “escape clause.”  (See Table 1.)  Four of these six
decisions have been challenged in the World Trade Organization (WTO) for violating the
Agreement on Safeguards reached in the Uruguay Round.  In each instance, the WTO dispute
settlement process has found some part of the ITC’s decision inconsistent with U.S. obligations
under that agreement.  As a result, in several cases the trade remedy was abandoned or
significantly modified.  
This judicial review of ITC practice raises important legal and political questions about
the conformity of U.S. trade law and practice with WTO obligations.  Although the simplest
solution is for the ITC to bring its safeguard determinations into conformity with WTO
obligations, the method for doing so is not entirely clear and such an adjustment may be difficult
if the WTO requirements differ significantly from U.S. law.  If future ITC decisions do not
conform to the WTO requirements, those safeguard actions are also likely to be challenged.  In
that case, U.S. policymakers are given the difficult choice of abandoning safeguard remedies, a
risky path to take given the political attachment of the Congress to the integrity of U.S. trade
law, or ignoring dispute settlement decisions, thereby undermining the WTO system.
1 
This is the broad setting for this paper’s examination of one of the narrow issues upon-2-
which the ITC has had difficulty with the WTO.  Under the Agreement on Safeguards, the ITC is
required to ensure that increased imports are a contributing cause of serious injury and that
injury resulting from factors unrelated to increased imports is not attributed to imports.  WTO
panel and Appellate Body reports have repeatedly found that the ITC has failed to ensure that
non-import-related injury is not attributed to imports, but have not indicated how the ITC should
comply with this provision.  
This paper begins by examining the subtle differences between the legal requirements of
non-attribution in safeguard actions under U.S. trade law (Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974)
and in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.  The paper investigates how these differences have
played out in the dispute resolution process in several recent U.S. safeguard actions.  The paper
then resurrects the Kelly (1988) method of attributing injury to various factors relating to
changes in supply, demand, and imports, and applies the method to recent safeguard cases
(Wheat Gluten, Lamb, Line Pipe, Wire Rod, and Steel).  The results demonstrate how the ITC
could use this approach to comply with the WTO requirements without really compromising the
results of its decision-making process. 
2.  The Legal Framework for Safeguard Actions 
Safeguard provisions permit a country to raise trade barriers that are otherwise bound in
trade agreements in order to provide short-term protection to an industry harmed by foreign
competition.  Such provisions have been an integral part of U.S. trade policy ever since an
executive order in 1945 required their inclusion in trade agreements signed by the United States. 
That order was in response to pressure from Congress to ensure that, as tariffs came down as a-3-
2  Hoekman and Kostecki (2001, p. 303) argue that “Safeguard provisions are often
critical to the existence and operation of trade-liberalizing agreements, as they function as both
insurance mechanisms and safety valves.  They provide governments with the means to renege
on specific liberalization commitments – subject to certain conditions – should the need for this
arise (safety valves).  Without them governments may refrain from signing an agreement that
reduces protection substantially (insurance motive).”  For a more critical view of safeguards, see
Sykes (1991).
3  All quotations to U.S. law are from the compilation in U.S. House of Representatives
(1997).
4  With respect to the “threat” of serious injury, the statute points to such factors as a
decline in sales or market share, a higher and growing inventory (whether maintained by
domestic producers, importers, wholesalers, or retailers), and a downward trend in production,
result of trade agreements, provision was made to provide temporary assistance to industries
adversely affected by imports.
2  
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 sets out the conditions under which safeguard
actions can be implemented in the United States.  Under Section 201, after receiving a petition
from a domestic industry, the ITC is required to conduct an investigation “to determine whether
an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a
substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an
article like or directly competitive with the imported article.”
3  
The key phrases here are “substantial cause” and “serious injury.”  Serious injury is
defined as “a significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic industry.”  In
determining whether serious injury has taken place, the statute directs the ITC to “take into
account all economic factors which it considers relevant,” such as the significant idling of
productive facilities in the industry (the closing of plants or the underutilization of production
capacity), the inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a reasonable level of profit,
and significant unemployment or underemployment within the industry.
4  The presence or-4-
profits, wages, productivity or employment (or increasing underemployment) in the domestic
industry concerned.
5  See U.S. International Trade Commission (1999a, p. I-21, footnote 106).  The statute
also says that the ITC should “consider the condition of the domestic industry over the course of
the relevant business cycle, but may not aggregate the causes of declining demand associated
with a recession or economic downturn in the United States economy into a single cause of
serious injury or threat of injury.”  This provision does not seem relevant for cases filed between
1995 and 2001, a period when there was no general economic downturn.  
absence of any single factor is not necessarily decisive in determining whether the “serious
injury” threshold is met.  
A “substantial cause” is defined as “a cause which is important and not less than any
other cause.”  While increased imports may be a source of injury to a domestic industry, imports
must be a more (or no less) important source of injury than any other factor for it to constitute a
“substantial cause” and thereby permit trade relief.  In determining whether imports are a
substantial cause of injury, the ITC is instructed by the statute to look for an increase in imports
(either actual or relative to domestic production) and a decline in the proportion of the domestic
market supplied by domestic producers.  The legislative history of Section 201 suggests that
other sources of injury include “changes in technology or in consumer tastes, domestic
competition from substitute products, plant obsolescence, or poor management.”  If such factors
are found to be a more important cause of injury than increased imports, a negative
determination would be appropriate.
5  The statute, however, provides no indication of how the
ITC is to determine whether an increase in imports is a more important source of injury than any
of other source.
Largely at the insistence of the United States, safeguard provisions have also been
included in multilateral trade agreements.  Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and-5-
6  Article 4.2(a) is also similar to Section 201 in this regard:  “In the investigation to
determine whether increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury to a
domestic industry under the terms of this Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all
relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that
industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in
absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports,
changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses,
and employment.” 
Trade (GATT) is a broadly-written provision that permits countries to suspend their obligations
under the agreement and impose temporary trade barriers.  The Agreement on Safeguards,
reached during the Uruguay Round negotiations, sets out more specific standards than Article
XIX for the application of safeguard measures.  To a large extent, the language in the Safeguards
Agreement mirrors that in Section 201.  Under Article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement, for
example, WTO members “may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has
determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being imported into its
territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces
like or directly competitive products.”  Similarly, Article 3.1 requires that national authorities
undertake an investigation to determine if imports have caused serious injury before imposing a
safeguard measure and Article 4.1(a) defines “serious injury” as “a significant overall
impairment in the position of a domestic industry.”
6  
Given the similar language in both Section 201 and the Safeguards Agreement, it is
difficult to see how differences in interpretation between the ITC and the WTO could exist over
such actions.  One hitch, however, has been the somewhat different language in Article 4.2(b) of
the Safeguard Agreement.  According to this subsection, a positive finding of serious injury shall-6-
7  That this is not always the case is demonstrated by the ITC’s rejection of two Section
201 petitions in 2000.  In the Crabmeat case, the import market share went from 26.8 percent in
1995 to 70.1 percent in 1999, yet the divided Commission determined that the industry did not
suffer from “serious injury” because it failed to find any significant overall impairment in the
position of the domestic industry.
8  For example, the Panel in the Wheat Gluten case agreed with the ITC approach in that
“a coincidence in the movements in imports and the movements in injury factors would
ordinarily tend to support a finding of causation.”  WTO (2000), para 8.95.   See Kaplan (1991)
for a discussion of the methods by which the ITC determines that import “cause” injury in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases.
not be made 
“unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence
of the causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury
or threat thereof.  When factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the
domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased
imports.”  
The “causal link” requires objective evidence that harm to an industry coincides with a period of
increased imports or import penetration.  This causation standard has occasionally been
problematic, but a more persistent source of difficulty has been the non-attribution standard in
the last sentence – that other sources of injury shall not be attributed to increased imports. 
3.  Injury Attribution in Recent ITC Decisions
Most ITC determinations of “increased imports” and “serious injury” are relatively
straightforward factual matters.  In most – but not all – Section 201 cases, the domestic industry
has suffered from some demonstrable economic distress and import penetration has increased
markedly.
7  Both the ITC and WTO panels agree that the coincidence of a higher level of imports
and a lower level of domestic activity usually constitutes sufficient evidence that imports have
caused injury.
8-7-
9  Another Section 201 case in which trade remedies were applied is Certain Steel Wire
Rod.  However, a large share of imports came from Canada and Mexico, which were excluded
from the safeguard action because they are members of NAFTA.  The remaining suppliers were
relatively small and did not contest the measure before the WTO.
The attribution of injury clause of the Safeguards Agreement requires the ITC to do
something that it should have been doing under Section 201 anyway, but may have been doing
only in a pro forma way.  Section 201 directs the ITC to make a “substantial cause”
determination, i.e., a finding that imports are “a cause which is important and not less than any
other cause” in injuring the domestic industry.  Article 4.2(b) requires that injury attributed to
factors other than imports not be attributed to imports.  The U.S. statute requires that the various
sources of injury be rank ordered, which implies that they must be separated.  The WTO
obligation does not require a rank ordering of sources of injury, but does require that the sources
of injury be separated.  The Safeguards Agreement does not require that imports be the most
important cause of injury, just that the injury caused by other factors not be attributed to imports. 
Thus, the WTO standards for safeguard actions appear to be less stringent than those of Section
201.  
Unfortunately for the ITC, the Commission has been very loose in its interpretation of
“substantial cause” in the past, and now it is being challenged in the WTO on the non-attribution
issue.  This problem can be illustrated by examining ITC decision-making in four recent cases
contested before the WTO: Wheat Gluten, Lamb Meat, Line Pipe, and Steel.
9  
In Wheat Gluten, the Commission (1998, p. I-16) wrote: “We reviewed carefully the
alternative causes of injury suggested by the parties and other possible causes, and have
concluded that increased imports are both an important cause of serious injury and a cause that is-8-
greater than any other cause.”  Several paragraphs then gave the reasoning behind the judgment
that the other factors, such as developments in co-product (wheat starch) market adversely
affecting domestic producers or a rise in the cost of raw materials (wheat flour), were not as
important as imports.  
In Lamb, the Commission described the coincidence of the declining economic condition
of the industry and the rise in imports.  “As required by the statute,” the ITC (1999a, p. I-24)
noted, “we considered whether any other cause might be a more important cause of the threat of
serious injury than increased imports.”  The leading candidate as an alternative source of injury
was the termination of federal government subsidies to lamb and sheep farmers under the
National Wool Act of 1954.  In 1993, Congress enacted legislation phasing out the support
payments in 1994 and 1995.  The ITC had “no doubt” that the loss of government financial
support hurt lamb growers, but maintained that this was a “less important cause” of injury than
imports (p. I-25).  The precise basis for this judgment was not made clear.  The ITC also looked
at competition from other meat products, higher costs of production, and the lack of an effective
marketing program as other possible causes of injury, but in each case ruled that they were less
important factors than increased imports. 
In Line Pipe, the Commission examined as an alternative source of injury the decline in
demand for line pipe due to a reduction in oil and natural gas drilling and production activities. 
Five of six commissioners argued that there was “no question that such a substantial decline in
demand contributed to the serious injury experienced by the domestic industry” but that they
were “not persuaded” that it was “a greater contributing factor to the industry’s serious injury
than the imports” since the decline in demand would not explain the dramatic fall in market-9-
share held by domestic producers (1999b, p. I-28).  Therefore, increased imports were judged “as
great or greater” a factor as declining demand in producing injury (p. I-30).  However, a
dissenting commissioner argued that the industry was not seriously injured, nor was threatened
with serious injury, but that had the domestic industry been judged to suffer serious injury, the
most important cause of the injury would have been the decline in demand for welded pipe in the
oil and gas industry.  
The Steel safeguard cases involved 33 separate product categories in which the ITC ruled
affirmatively in 16.  The focus here will be on the most important category, certain carbon and
alloy flat-rolled products, including slab, hot-rolled, and cold-rolled bar.  The Commission
considered declining domestic demand, intra-industry competition, domestic capacity increases,
and other factors as non-import sources of injury.  The ITC (2001b, p. 59ff) ruled that the decline
in demand came too late in the period of investigation to be a more important cause of injury
than imports and that the intra-industry competition from mini-mills was a constant factor
throughout the period.  In addition, the expansion of domestic capacity, “while likely playing a
role in the price declines that helped cause injury, was not an important cause of serious injury to
the domestic industry equal to or greater than the injury cause by increased imports” because
these capacity increases did not “lead prices downward, and wrest market share from imports.”  
Thus, from this brief examination of recent cases, it appears that the ITC essentially
makes an informed but ultimately qualitative judgment call about the relative importance of
various possible sources of injury.  The determinations are not made with any explicit method,
but a loose if reasoned sense among the Commissioners that the various factors causing injury
carry the weight they do.  The determinations vary in the depth and persuasiveness of the-10-
analysis of “substantial cause.”  Some rulings seem arbitrary and simply based on assertions
(such as Lamb) while others are carefully considered and argued.  None of them are based on
any quantitative analysis and rarely has the ITC faced scrutiny or been forced to defend its
decision-making process to other bodies.  
In each of these cases, a trade remedy was imposed.  In each case, the country or
countries principally affected by the safeguard action contested the case in the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism:  the European Union in the case of wheat gluten, Australia and New
Zealand in the case of lamb meat, Korea in the case of line pipe, and the European Union and
others in the case of steel.  Among the many complaints made by each of these countries was the
allegation that the United States violated Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement in not
ensuring that injury caused by factors other than imports had not been attributed to imports. 
4.  WTO Review of ITC Attribution Determinations
In each of these cases, WTO Panels have upheld many aspects of ITC decision-making,
but have had problems with the way in which the ITC attributed injury to imports and other
factors.  In the case of Wheat Gluten, for example, the Panel ruled that the ITC’s serious injury
determination was not inconsistent with Article 4.2(a).  Furthermore, the causation standard was
met because an upward trend in imports coincided with a downward trend in injury factors. 
However, the Panel held that the ITC violated Article 4.2(b) in not ensuring that injury cause by
other factors was not attributed to imports.  In doing so, the Panel put forth a particular
interpretation of the Safeguard Agreement in which Members must not only separate, but also
essentially rank order injury factors much like Section 201.  -11-
The Panel noted that “Article 4.2(a) and (b) require a Member: (i) to demonstrate the
existence of the causal link between increased imports and serious injury; and (ii) not to attribute
injury being cause by other factors to the domestic industry at the same time to increased
imports.”  The Panel argued that, “read together, these two propositions require that a Member
demonstrate that the increased imports, under the conditions extant in the marketplace, in and of
themselves, cause serious injury” (para 8.138).  In other words, simply demonstrating that
imports had increased and that injury had occurred was insufficient.  If there are multiple causes
of injury, then imports alone, independent of other factors, must be capable of causing injury that
meets the threshold of “serious” as defined in the Agreement.  
The Panel concluded that “the USITC’s causation analysis does not ensure that imports,
in and of themselves, are sufficient to cause serious injury to the domestic industry once injury
caused by other factors is not attributed to imports” (para. 8.152).  It could be the case, the Panel
argued, that after deducting the injury due to other factors “any remaining injury caused by
increased imports may not reach the threshold of serious injury” (para 8.143).  While the ITC
suggested that increased capacity investment by domestic producers could have been a source of
injury, the Panel noted that “we see no indication in the USITC Report that imports were not also
held responsible for the injury caused by this factor” (para 8.151).  
The Panel was agnostic about how this attribution should be done, noting that the
Safeguard Agreement does not impose 
“any particular method for assessing whether any factors other than import are causing
injury to its domestic market at the same time as imports, or how to go about ensuring
that injury attributable to other factors is not attributed to imports.  The United States
remains free to choose a method for making this assessment and ensuring non-
attribution” (para 8.140). 
 -12-
The Panel also noted that a precise calculation of the different sources of injury was not
mandated:  
“A Member is not necessarily required to quantify, on an individual basis, the precise
extent of ‘injury’ caused by each other possible factor.  However, a Member must
conduct an examination that ensures that any injury caused by such other factors is not
attributed to increased imports.” (Para 8.142)
The Wheat Gluten Panel’s interpretation would have pushed the WTO requirement for
safeguard actions beyond the standard in U.S. law under Section 201.  A hypothetical example
illustrates the issues involved.   Suppose an industry has been judged to suffer “serious injury”
and that imports are responsible for 40 percent of the injury and the remaining 60 percent is
divided among two other factors.  Then imports are a “substantial” cause – the most important
cause – of injury.  This meets the requirements of Section 201, of separating and rank ordering
the causes of serious injury, and the ITC is done.  But the Panel maintained that import alone
must be capable of injury that meets the threshold of “serious.”  Thus, in the Panel’s view, after
taking way 60 percent of injury cause by other factors, the remaining 40 percent of injury
attributed to imports must be significant enough to meet the “serious injury” threshold.  This
would have pushed the WTO standard from one that appears to be less burdensome than Section
201 to one that is more burdensome. 
In its review of Wheat Gluten, however, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s view
that imports alone must be capable of causing serious injury.  According to the AB report, “the
need to distinguish between the effects caused by increased imports and the effects caused by
other factors does not necessarily imply, as the Panel said, that increased imports on their own
must be capable of causing serious injury, nor that injury caused by other factors must be
excluded from the determination of serious injury” (para 70).  They noted that Article 4.2(a)-13-
10  For example, the Appellate Body found that the ITC had not adequately demonstrated
that some forms of injury (increase in average capacity) had not been attributed to increased
imports and therefore acted inconsistently with Article 4.2(b).  
states that, in making the “serious injury” determination, the competent authorities “shall
evaluate all relevant factors . . . having a bearing on the situation in that industry.”  The AB
noted that these factors relate both to imports specifically and overall situation generally and that
“the language of the provision does not distinguish between, or attach special importance or
preference to, any of the listed factors” (para. 72). 
To further support its reasoning, the AB pointed to Article 2.1 of the Safeguards
Agreement, which states that safeguard measures may be imposed when foreign products are
being imported “under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
domestic industry” (emphasis added).  To the AB, the phrase “under such conditions” implies
that “the competent authorities should determine whether the increase in imports, not alone, but
in conjunction with the other relevant factors, cause serious injury” (para. 78).  At the same time,
the AB agreed with the Panel that the ITC had not adequately demonstrated that injury caused by
increases in average capacity had not been attributed to increased imports.  On this and other
issues, the AB agreed with the panel that the ITC had erred in failing to ensure that the various
causes of injury were not confounded.
10
The AB ruling restored the Safeguards Agreement to a weaker standard than Section 201
because the Agreement only requires the separation, and not the rank ordering, of different
causes of injury.  Considering another hypothetical example, if there were just two sources of
injury, imports and factor X in which 10 percent of injury was attributed to imports and 90
percent to factor X, then this separation would satisfy the WTO obligations as long as there was-14-
serious injury (and causal role for imports, meaning an upward trend in imports coinciding with
a downward trend in injury factors).  However, it would not meet the “substantial cause”
requirement of Section 201.  
As a result of these decisions, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) requested that the
ITC make its findings in the Wheat Gluten case conform to the findings of the WTO.  In its
report, the ITC (2001, p. 13) again explained the reasoning for its determination and maintained
that it had not attributed injury from other sources to imports:  “While the increase in industry
capacity had some impact on the condition of the domestic industry, the available data do not
indicated that it had a significant effect on industry performance, and we do not attribute the
modest impact of the capacity increase to increased imports.”  The ITC essentially restated its
qualitative assessment about injury attribution, which may be in fact accurate but was based on
judgment and not on formal analysis. 
The Panel in the Lamb case issued a finding very similar to that in Wheat Gluten because
the AB had yet to rule on the Wheat Gluten case.  As with Wheat Gluten, the AB ruling on Lamb
reversed the Panel’s interpretation on causation:  
“In a situation where several factors are causing injury ‘at the same time’, a final
determination about the injurious effects caused by increased imports can only be made if
the injurious effects caused by all the different causal factors are distinguished and
separated.  Otherwise, any conclusion based exclusively on an assessment of only one of
the causal factors – increased imports – rests on an uncertain foundation, because it
assumes that the other causal factors are not causing the injury which has been ascribed
to increased imports.  The non-attribution language in Article 4.2(b) precludes such an
assumption and, instead, requires that the competent authorities assess appropriately the
injurious effects of the other factors, so that those effects may be disentangled from the
injurious effects of the increased imports.  In this way, the final determination rests,
properly, on the genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect between
increased imports and serious injury.” (para. 179). 
 
The important requirement of Article 4.2(b) was to separate and distinguish the sources-15-
of injury.  Yet the AB conceded that this leaves “unanswered many methodological questions
relating to the non-attribution requirement found in the second sentence of Article 4.2(b) . . . .
We emphasize that the method and approach WTO Members choose to carry out the process of
separating the effects of increased imports and the effect of other causal factors is not specified
in the Agreement on Safeguards” (para. 178, 180).  
The AB also pointed to an important distinction between Section 201 and the Safeguards
Agreement:  “Although an examination of the relative causal importance of the different causal
factors may satisfy the requirements of United States law, such an examination does not, for that
reason, satisfy the requirement of the Agreement on Safeguards” (para 184).  Once again the AB
found fault with the ITC because it did “not explain the process by which the USITC separated
the injurious effects of the different causal factors” (185).  For example, in examining the loss of
federal subsidies to the wool industry, the ITC “provides no insight into the nature and extent of
the ‘hurt’ caused to the domestic industry by this factor” (para. 185).  
The WTO Panel in the Line Pipe case also concerned itself with the issue of attribution
because the injury resulting from declining demand in the oil and gas industry could have rivaled
that of increased imports.  The Panel stated: 
“the methodology used in its analysis of the injury caused by the oil and gas decline has
the objective (consistent with applicable U.S. law) of determining whether this factor is a
more important cause of injury than the increased imports.  We are not convinced that
such a determination is enough to satisfy the requirements of Article 4.2(b)” (Para.
7.288).  
Although the ITC recognized that the decline in the oil and gas industry injured the domestic line
pipe industry, “it is not apparent from this analysis how, if at all, the ITC separated the injurious
effects of the decline in the oil and gas industry from the injurious effects of the increased-16-
imports.  The ITC’s analysis provides no insight into the nature and extent of the injury caused
by the decline in the oil and gas industry” (para. 7.288).  
The AB restated its view on injury attribution:
“Article 4.2(b) does not require that increased imports be the sole cause of serious injury. 
In addition, we determined in US – Wheat Gluten that the causation requirement of
Article 4.2(b) can be met where the serious injury is caused by the interplay of increased
imports and other factors.  In other words, to meet the causation requirement in Article
4.2(b), it is not necessary to show that increased imports alone—on their own—must be
capable of causing serious injury” (para. 209)
 
The AB upheld the Panel’s finding that the ITC failed to follow the non-attribution provision,
stating that: 
“to fulfill the requirement of Article 4.2(b), last sentence, the competent authorities must
establish explicitly, through a reasoned and adequate explanation, that injury caused by
factors other than increased imports is not attributed to increased imports.  This
explanation must be clear and unambiguous.  It must not merely imply or suggest an
explanation.  It must be a straightforward explanation in express terms.” (para. 217)
The AB continued with the following strong language:   
“The passage on page I-30 of the USITC Report highlighted by the United States is but a
mere assertion that injury caused by other factors is not attributed to increased imports. 
A mere assertion such as this does not establish explicitly, with a reasoned and adequate
explanation, that injury caused by factors other than the increased imports was not
attributed to increased imports.  This brief assertion in the ITC Report offers no
reasoning and no explanation at all, and therefore falls short of what we have earlier
described as a reasoned and adequate explanation” (para. 220).
Yet, having pushed the issue this far, it is not entirely clear what the panels and AB are
looking for in terms of attribution.  The bodies have not specified any method for ensuring non-
attribution and have said that a quantitative approach is not required, but are not very
constructive in terms of suggesting how the ITC can better assess the injury caused by other
factors.  Furthermore, since the WTO bodies have determined that imports themselves need not
be a cause of serious injury, the entire exercise of apportioning injury to various factors becomes-17-
11  USTR abandoned the trade remedy not just because the ITC report was not in
conformity with Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguard Agreement, but because of several problems
relating to the failure to demonstrate “unforeseen developments” as required by Article XIX of
the GATT and an inconsistent definition of the domestic industry.  See the press release, “Bush
Administration Settles Lamb Safeguard Issue with Australia and New Zealand,” USTR, August
21, 2001.
12  See the press release, “United States and Korea Resolve WTO Dispute on Line Pipe,”
USTR, July 29, 2002.
semantic.  Non-attribution requires the authorities to separate and distinguish the sources of
injury but otherwise plays no substantive role in the proceedings and cannot affect the end result. 
At least with the “substantial cause” requirement of Section 201, the ranking of various injury-
causing factors plays a crucial role in the process.  So there is a point to a decomposition and
non-attribution exercise under U.S. law, while there is no point under WTO law except that it is
required by Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement. 
Before considering a potential resolution to this impasse, the consequences of these
rulings should be briefly noted.  Although the ITC was found to have erred, USTR was
responsible for bringing the safeguard action into conformity with WTO obligations.  In two of
the four cases, the safeguard trade remedy was lifted in advance of its expiration in order to
comply with the WTO rulings.  In Lamb, USTR terminated the safeguard remedy eight months
before it was set to expire and provided financial adjustment assistance to domestic producers.
11 
In Line Pipe, USTR reached a negotiated settlement with South Korea after the AB report that
allowed imports of line pipe to increase in stages and went into effect just seven months before
the safeguard measure was set to expire.
12  In Wheat Gluten, USTR did not terminate the trade
remedy after the WTO rulings and the EU retaliated against U.S. exports of corn gluten.  Wheat
Gluten producers requested an extension of the import quotas before they set to expire, but-18-
13  See the press release, “Bush Administration Helps Wheat Gluten Industry Restore its
Competitiveness,” USTR, June 1, 2001.
USTR denied this request in June 2001 and the EU lifted its retaliatory duty.
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5.  Economic Framework for Injury Attribution 
To adhere to the injury attribution provisions of the Safeguard Agreement, and even to
the “substantial cause” provision of Section 201 more carefully than it has, the ITC must
essentially decompose injury into its various underlying causes.  As the ITC has failed to
produce an acceptable “reasoned” solution to the non-attribution issue, an economic or
analytical-based approach may solve the ITC’s problem.  Unfortunately, as Durling and
McCullough (2002, p. 10) note, “Although causation and non-attribution are often the central
issues in any trade remedy case, the ITC has developed only very primitive analytical tools to
address these crucial issues.”  
Economic analysis provides a simple framework in which to analyze injury attribution
and even develop empirical methods that can quantify injury.  Figure 1 sets out the framework
for analysis.  This figure shows domestic demand (D) in the home country for the product in
question, as well as total supply (S + M) to the market, which is simply the horizontal sum of
domestic supply (S) and import supply (the distance between S and S + M).  Total supply
intersects domestic demand and determines the market-clearing price (P).  At this price P, the
quantity supplied by domestic producers is QS and the quantity demanded by domestic
consumers is QD, with imports constituting the difference between the two (QD - QS).  
This market equilibrium can be disturbed by shifts in domestic demand, domestic supply,-19-
and import supply.  Each shift has a different effect on the price, imports, and domestic
consumption and production.  For example, Figure 2 illustrates an outward shift in the import
supply curve that shifts total supply from S + M to S + M’ but does not affect the position of the
domestic supply curve (S).  This shift reduces the equilibrium price and thereby increases
domestic consumption, reduces domestic production, and increases imports.  The motivation for
safeguard trade restrictions is presumably to prevent the domestic industry from being injured by
precisely such short-term import supply shocks.  
Alternatively, an increase in domestic demand, illustrated in Figure 3, would lead to an
increase in imports and even the import market share if – as is likely to be the case – the
elasticity of import supply is greater than the elasticity of domestic supply.  However, this
increase in imports presumably would not be a source of injury to domestic producers because
the domestic price and domestic production would also have risen as a result of the demand shift. 
Conversely, a decline in demand would reduce the price and domestic production, but imports
again would not be a source of injury because they too would have fallen in response to the
decline in demand.  Finally, shifts in domestic supply can alter the market equilibrium.  A
decrease in domestic supply would push the domestic price higher and draw in additional
imports, but the increased imports are a response to the shift in domestic supply, and thus it is
hard to view them as an independent cause of injury.  
Over any given period, of course, domestic supply, import supply, and domestic demand
will be changing at the same time.  From the standpoint of the legal requirements of the
Safeguards Agreement, the key is to isolate the impact of shifts in import supply when domestic
supply and demand are also changing.  One way in which changes in import supply might be-20-
14  The Lamb case may be one in which the Commission was under political pressure to
reach an affirmative finding.  Senator Max Baucus of Montana, and an important member of the
Senate Finance Committee that oversees the ITC budget, testified before the Commission on
behalf of the petitioners.  Hansen and Prusa (1997) examine the susceptibility of ITC decision
making to political pressure from Congress. 
interpreted as having the dominant impact on the market is simply to observe the changes in
prices and quantities.  In the example considered above, if import supply has shifted to the right,
then the price and domestic production should fall while imports and domestic consumption
should rise.  
Table 2 presents some basic data from the recent Section 201 cases to see if market
developments in these cases are consistent with this benchmark.  For example, the observed
changes in Wheat Gluten market are consistent with an outward shift in import supply:  between
1995 and 1997, the domestic price fell, domestic production fell, imports increased, and
domestic consumption increased.  By contrast, the Lamb case is quite different.  In this case, the
domestic price rose (and import prices rose substantially) and consumption fell while domestic
production declined and imports increased.  This set of observations is more consistent with a
negative domestic supply shock – such as a reduction in federal subsidies – which results in
imports being drawn in as a result of declining domestic production, rather than being an
independent, causal factor of injury.
14  It is easier to find that imports were a cause of injury in
the Line Pipe case because imports and consumption increased markedly, although the decline in
domestic production was small and the prices of domestic and imported goods move in opposite
directions. 
The table also considers the Wire Rod case, which was not contested in the WTO.  With
the exception of the fact that domestic production rose slightly, the characteristics of this case-21-
also appear to be consistent with imports being a source of injury.  The Steel cases are more of a
challenge.  In the case of slab, there does not appear to be any pronounced import surge or
decline in domestic production.  In hot-rolled products, import penetration increased between
1996 and 1998, but then fell by 2000, but there was no reduction in domestic output.  The same
is true in cold-rolled steel.  Hence, the “serious injury” determination was an important part of
these cases.  
Thus, with the notable exception of the Lamb case and the possible exception of Steel,
the basic market indicators – interpreted in the context of the simple economic framework
outlined above and illustrated in the Figures 1-3 – are broadly consistent with the ITC rulings. 
The next step is to use a simple method that provides a quantitative breakdown of the relative
importance of shifts in supply, demand, and imports in affecting domestic production.  Three
alternative methods exist: the econometric approaches of Grossman (1986) and Pindyck and
Rotemberg (1987) and the simulation approach of Kelly (1988).
Using the steel industry as an example, Grossman (1986) estimates a reduced-form
equation that determines domestic production as a function of the relative price of imports, the
relative price of inputs (such as iron and energy), and an indicator of overall demand (industrial
production).  The parameter estimates indicate the sensitivity of domestic production to the
relative price of imports and to other supply and demand factors.  The estimated equation can be
used for counterfactual analysis and determine the impact of these factors on domestic supply. 
Using the copper industry as an example, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1987) develop a framework
for examining the injurious impact of not just exogenous variation in import supply but also
endogenous increases in imports (such as when demand increases).  Unlike Grossman, they do-22-
15  For a comparison of the Grossman and Pindyck and Rotemberg approaches, see
Rousslang (1988).  In using a specific economic framework to analyze these decisions, of course,
one is taking a stand on how to interpret the safeguards law; Sykes (2003) argues that the law is
quite vague and often contradictory.
16  In some cases, there is even the issue of data availability: many of the products
considered in Section 201 cases are very narrowly defined.  As a result, it is unlikely that
sufficient time-series data is available on such products as extruded rubber thread or circular
welded carbon quality line pipe.  There is also the difficult issue of how to model industry
specific policies, such as federal government payments to lamb producers.  Durling and
McCullough (2002) discuss the reluctance of the ITC to rely on econometric analysis.  
not employ a model of industry structure, but rather rely on Granger-causality regressions to
determine the degree of injury caused by all sources of import variation.
15 
The econometric approach has the advantage of allowing industry-specific cost and
demand factors to be incorporated into the analysis.  The approach can be used to pose sharp
counterfactual questions and address detailed questions of attribution.  The problem with the
econometric approach is that it introduces a host of contestable issues, first and foremost model
specification.  In constructing any empirical model, choices must be made about model structure
and design and in many cases there is no clear cut way of determining which choices are
appropriate and which are inappropriate.  In addition, there are questions about which data to
use, which time frame to examine, which variables to include, etc.  As a result, there will not
necessarily be any consensus about which approach is best and different empirical results can
emerge from differing approaches.
16 
An alternative, non-econometric approach is set out in the neglected article by Kelly
(1988).  This model, described more fully in the appendix to this paper, is a simple linear
specification of the framework set out in Figure 1 and described above.  An attractive feature of
the model is the simplicity of its data requirements: all that is required to implement the model is-23-
17  In this respect, the approach is somewhat similar to the COMPAS model framework
currently used by the ITC to evaluate the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties.  
the market data presented in Table 2 and elasticity values for domestic supply and demand and
import supply.
17  In essence, the model decomposes the observed changes in domestic production
into shifts in demand, supply, and imports as implied by – and consistent with – those elasticities
and the observed changes in the market data. 
Table 3 uses the Kelly framework to examine the relative size of demand, supply, and
import changes in each of the Section 201 cases considered in this paper.  The simplest model is
where domestic production and imports are treated as perfect substitutes for one another, an
assumption that allows imports to have the greatest impact on domestic production.  (The model
can be modified to treat them as imperfect substitutes; see the original Kelly article.)  The data
required by the model is taken from the ITC reports and the elasticities of demand, domestic
supply and import supply, ranges for which are typically given in ITC reports.  Finally, results
are presented using both the domestic price and the import price, since there is sometimes a
discrepancy between the two (most notably in Line Pipe, where the domestic price rises but the
import price falls).
Table 3 presents the decomposition results.  For Wheat Gluten, the results clearly suggest
that a shift in import supply was the leading cause of the decline in domestic production.  As
suggested earlier, of all the cases considered, this particular one appears to be the most
unambiguous in terms of imports causing injury.  For Lamb, the results clearly point to an
adverse shift in domestic supply as generating the decline in domestic production.  This is
consistent with the termination of federal support payments as inflicting the most harm on-24-
18  For a detailed analysis of the lamb case, see Horn and Mavroidis (2003).
producers, with imports playing a rather minor role.
18  In the Line Pipe case, imports appear to be
the dominant cause of injury to domestic producers, even as demand appears to be strong.  The
discussion in this case hinged on whether declining demand from the oil and gas industry was as
responsible for injury as imports, yet it is hard to hold to the declining demand interpretation
when the domestic price of line pipe is rising and domestic consumption of pipe is increasing,
unless the products are highly differentiated. 
In the case of Wire Rod, positive movements in domestic demand and supply more than
offset the injury due to imports, but a shift in import supply was a negative factor for the
domestic industry.  Similarly, in the three specific steel products in which the ITC found injury
(slab, hot and cold-rolled steel), imports were a source of injury in each case even though shifts
in demand and supply enabled domestic production to increase. 
Thus, although the simple decomposition exercise does not tell us much more than is
revealed by a simple examination of price and quantity trends, it does at least provide a
quantitative breakdown of the implied relative contribution of the factors affecting domestic
production.  One advantage of the Grossman (1986) econometric approach, however, is that it
can separate out various factors responsible for a shift in import supply, such as exchange rate
movements, tariff reductions, etc.  The Kelly approach does not enable different sources of
supply and demand shifts to be separated, but treats them in aggregate.  
Still, this type of analysis may help the ITC adhere to the WTO’s non-attribution
requirements.  It may be of less use in the “substantial cause” determination because different
distinct factors that shift supply and demand are not separated.  For example, if domestic-25-
production declines 15 percent, five percentage points of which are due to imports and ten
percentage points of which are due to declining domestic demand, imports could still be the most
important cause of injury if several different factors contribute to the decline in demand.  Despite
these limitations, the greater use of economic analysis at the ITC can only strengthen the
credibility of its decisions.
6.  Conclusions
To date, the ITC has had difficulty in bringing its safeguard determinations into
conformity with the requirements of the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards.  This paper proposes
that economic analysis, specifically, the Kelly (1988) framework of injury attribution, be
employed to enable the ITC to ensure that injury caused by non-import related factors is not
attributed to imports.  With the exception of the Lamb case, this method reaches findings that are
consistent with past ITC safeguard decisions and thus would not impose a significant burden on
the agency while allowing it to adhere to the WTO agreement.-26-
Appendix:
This appendix briefly presents the Kelly (1988) model that treats domestic and imported
good as perfect substitutes.  (Kelly also develops an imperfect substitutes model; to the extent
that these goods are actually imperfect substitutes for one another, the perfect substitutes model
will overstates the impact of imports on the domestic market.)  Domestic demand, domestic
supply, and import supply are specified in simple linear terms such that:
(1) D = a + b P
(2) S = c + d P
(3) M = e + f P
(4) D = S + M,
where D is the quantity demanded, S is the quantity supplied by domestic producers, M is the
quantity of imports, and P is the market price.  Equation (1) is demand, equation (2) is domestic
supply, equation (3) is import supply, and equation (4) is a market clearing identity.  The
parameters a, c, and e are shift parameters for demand, supply, and imports, respectively.
Substituting equations (1)-(3) into (4) and solving for P yields:
(5) P = (a - c - e)/(- b + d + f).
Then 
(6)  S = c + d*(a - c - e)/(- b + d + f)
Totally differentiating equation (6) yields:
(7) ) S = (MS/Ma) )a + (MS/Mc) )c + (MS/Md) )d,
which states that the change in domestic supply can be decomposed into that due to shifts in
demand, shifts in supply, and shifts in imports.  Kelly describes how )a, )c, and )d can be-27-
solved for via Cramer’s rule.  Substituting the solutions back into (7) and rewriting in terms of
elasticities yields:
(8) ) S = (1/v) { [wD,D(0()P/P) - )D/D) @ D  (change in demand)
- (0 - wM,M)(,D )P/P) - )S/S) @ S  (change in supply)
- wD,D(0()P/P) - )M/M) @ M]}  (change in imports)
where v = (0 - wD,D - wM,M).  In this equation, wD = (S/D), wM = (M/D), ,D is the elasticity of
domestic supply, ,M is the elasticity of import supply, 0 is the elasticity of domestic demand. 
The terms )P/P, )S/S, )D/D, and )M/M are simply the observed changes in the price, supply,
demand, and imports in the period under consideration.-28-
Figure 1:   Market Equilibrium with Imports 
Figure 2: Market Equilibrium with Shift in Import Supply-29-
Figure 3: Market Equilibrium with a Shift in Domestic Demand-30-
Table 1: Section 201 Cases Since 1995
Year Product ITC Determination WTO Challenge?
1995 Fresh Winter Tomatoes Terminated – 
1996 Corn Brooms Affirmative No
1996 Fresh Tomatoes and Bell Peppers Negative – 
1997 Wheat Gluten Affirmative Yes
1998 Lamb Meat Affirmative Yes
1999 Certain Steel Wire Rod Affirmative (Tie) No
1999 Circular Welded Line Pipe Affirmative Yes
2000 Crabmeat from Swimming Crabs Negative – 
2000 Extruded Rubber Thread Negative – 
2001 Steel  Affirmative (16 of 33
cases)
Yes
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission.  -31-
Table 2: Selected Data from Section 201 Cases
A.  Wheat Gluten 
1995 1997 Percentage
Change
Consumption 255.5 294.2 15.1%
Domestic Production 127.5 117.1 -8.2%
Imports 128 177.1 38.4%
Import Market Share (percent) 50.1 60.2 --
Unit Value - Domestic $0.68 $0.61 -10.3%
Unit Value - Imports  $0.66 $0.56 -15.2%
Source:  USITC (1998), Table C-1.  Units: thousands of pounds.
B.  Lamb Meat
1995 1997 Percentage
Change
Consumption 320.8 306.6 -4.4%
Domestic Production 277.5 246.2 -11.3%
Imports 43.3 60.4 39.5%
Import Market Share (percent) 13.5 19.7 --
Unit Value - Domestic $1.62 $1.70 4.9%
Unit Value - Imports  $1.83 $2.28 24.6%
Source:  USITC (1999a), Table C-1.  Units: thousands of pounds.
C.  Line Pipe -32-
1996 1998 Percentage
Change
Consumption 791.5 971.4 22.7%
Domestic Production 664.9 640.2 -3.7%
Imports 126.6 331.2 161.6%
Import Market Share (percent) 16.0 34.1 --
Unit Value - Domestic $486 $504 3.7%
Unit Value - Imports  $483 $456 -5.6%
Source:  USITC (1999c), Table C-1.  Units: tons.
D.  Certain Steel Wire Rod 
1996 1998 Percentage
Change
Consumption 7.6 8.3 8.7%
Domestic Production 5.5 5.7 3.8%
Imports 2.1 2.5 21.8%
Import Market Share (percent) 27.4 30.7 --
Unit Value - Domestic $350 $340 -6.1%
Unit Value - Imports  $365 $342 -6.3%














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Attribution of Injury in Selected Section 201 Cases












-8.2 1.6 1.8 -11.6
Import
Price
-8.2 0.1 5.8 -14
Assumptions:   The ITC report had no information on elasticity values.  The assumed values are:
elasticity of demand (0) = -0.75, elasticity of domestic supply (,) = 1.0, elasticity of import













-11.3 0.2 -10 -1.4
Import
Price
-11.3 8.8 -22.2 2
Assumptions:  The ITC (1999a, pp. II-70, II-62) reports the three year elasticity of demand as
ranging from -0.75 to -1.25 and the three year elasticity of domestic supply as 0.7 to 1.3.  The
assumed values are: elasticity of demand (0) = -1.0, elasticity of domestic supply (,) = 1.0,
elasticity of import supply (() = 3.0












-3.7 16.5 -4.1 -16.1-37-
Import
Price
-3.7 13.3 2 -19.1
Assumptions: The ITC (1999c, pp. II-44, II-42) reports that demand is “lower degree of price
sensitivity” and “moderate to high” price sensitivity of supply.  The assumed values are:
elasticity of demand (0) = -0.5, elasticity of domestic supply (,) = 1.5, elasticity of import
supply (() = 3.0












3.6 4.6 5.1 -6.1
Import
Price
3.6 2.5 9.5 -8.4
Assumptions:  The ITC (1999b, pp. II-48) reports inelastic demand ranging from -0.5 to -0.75
and an elasticity of domestic supply as 2.0 to 4.0.  The assumed values are: elasticity of demand
(0) = -0.75, elasticity of domestic supply (,) = 3.0, elasticity of import supply (() = 3.0












+2.3 +2.9 +3.1 -3.4
Import
Price
+2.3 +1.4 +5.7 -4.9
Assumptions:  The ITC (2001b, p. FLAT-60) reports inelastic demand ranging from -0.4 to -0.6
and an elasticity of domestic supply from 3.0 to 6.0.  The assumed values are: elasticity of
demand (0) = -0.5, elasticity of domestic supply (,) = 5.0, elasticity of import supply (() = 5.0












+7.1 +4.9 +7.9 -5.8
Import
Price
+7.1 +4.3 +8.9 -6.2
Assumptions:  The ITC (2001b, p. FLAT-60) reports inelastic demand ranging from -0.4 to -0.6
and an elasticity of domestic supply from 3.0 to 6.0.  The assumed values are: elasticity of
demand (0) = -0.5, elasticity of domestic supply (,) = 5.0, elasticity of import supply (() = 5.0












+10.1 +5.1 +8.2 -3.2
Import
Price
+10.1 +5.4 +7.6 -3.0
Assumptions:  The ITC (2001b, p. FLAT-60) reports inelastic demand ranging from -0.4 to -0.6
and an elasticity of domestic supply from 3.0 to 6.0.  The assumed values are: elasticity of
demand (0) = -0.5, elasticity of domestic supply (,) = 5.0, elasticity of import supply (() = 5.0-39-
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